Still, the view here is that a presidential decision to wash his hands of Syria would receive strong majority support in public opinion polling. Would an effort of five years to bring about the enduring defeat of ISIS be wasted by near-term American disengagement? If liberated northeastern Syria is turned over to the Assad regime and its Iranian ally, what would prevent them from offering some at-large, skilled ISIS terrorists the option of employment for terror operations? Damascus and Tehran both have long histories of using Islamist terrorists for their own purposes.
The US intelligence community fears this very prospect. Would the Assad regime state terror be a better option for suppressing ISIS than effective local governance based on rule of law? Can the United States obtain for its Syrian partners—mainly Kurds, who have provided the ground force combat component of the war on ISIS—protection from the violent excesses of the Assad regime if the American presence in Syria is liquidated?
If not, a what would become of those who have worked with the United States, and b what might be the implications of abandonment for future American attempts globally to partner with indigenous forces? What would be the implications for regional friends and European allies if the United States were to disengage from Syria?
How likely is it that the Assad regime would repatriate six million refugees who fled its violence? What is the ability and inclination of the Assad regime to rule in a way that would preclude further massive refugee flows?
Can the Assad regime refrain from kleptocracy and preside competently over a reconstruction process that would stabilize Syria politically and economically? Or—if shedding a heavy burden is what drives US policy—would the abandonment of friends and allies adjacent to Syria and in Western Europe be the inevitable adjunct to disengagement from Syria itself? If the administration believes as it does that the Assad regime and in particular Iran enable, inspire, and accelerate the phenomenon of global Islamist terrorism and extremism, 12 Heather Nauert.
Recognizing that disengagement is not a cost-free option—that negative and unintended consequences will result—is essential. But this recognition does not suffice for policy formulation. If Syrian political transition is the goal, how to achieve it? What are the key elements of strategy? Kremlin accusations notwithstanding, there is a long-standing American political consensus that violent regime change should not be an element of US strategy.
Invading and occupying Syria has never been on the American agenda. American aid to Syrian rebels resisting state terror was never of a quality or quantity to drive the regime from Damascus.
That aid was unilaterally terminated in Instead, since the early stages of the Syrian uprising, the preferred American route to political transition has been one of Syrian peace negotiations under United Nations UN auspices. The Geneva Final Communique of June 30, , embodied an agreement between the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council that Syrian negotiators should populate, through mutual consent, a transitional governing body exercising full executive power in Syria while preserving governmental structures.
But the Assad regime rejected Geneva, spurned political transition, and mocked substantive peace negotiations. Regime opposition caused Russia to renege on that to which it agreed in If, therefore, the United States commits itself to Syrian political transition as the key that unlocks all other Syria-related policy goals, what are the elements of strategy that maximize the prospect of success without resorting to violent regime change?
Ultimately, sealing the victory over ISIS and maximizing leverage for peace talks is the main goal in stabilizing Syria; reinforced by denying northeastern Syria to the Assad regime and its allies.
The prospect of ISIS waging a successful comeback via insurgency depends upon either a political overreach by Kurds in predominantly Arab areas, or b the return of a profoundly hated Assad regime on the shoulders of Iranian-led Shia militiamen. Stabilizing liberated areas—with heavy contributions personnel and funding from US allies and partners—and facilitating the growth of legitimate and effective governance mandates excluding the Assad regime and its allies from northeastern Syria.
Exclusion does not mean Syrian partition. Neither does it mean barring Syrian civil servants from their jobs or denying food to Syrians languishing under regime rule. Successful stabilization—resulting in effective, legitimate local governance—will be neither easy nor quick nor cheap.
Burden-sharing among allies will be essential and will depend on allied evaluation of American commitment to the task. The potential contributions and participation of the democratic Syrian opposition should be maximized. And although stabilization will be neither the exclusive province of American taxpayers nor officials, American commitment and leadership will be essential. Successful stabilization will also require an ongoing American military presence on the ground, supported by the United States and coalition air combat power.
Local ground forces would secure the Euphrates River de-confliction line, supported by coalition including American ground assets and air power.
Having US forces on the ground assures two things: a ongoing operational focus on neutralizing at-large ISIS operatives; and b decisive lethality in response to any attempts to breach the Euphrates River line by the regime and its allies. The survival strategy of the Assad regime has featured mass civilian homicide aimed at separating, through state terror, armed rebels from a popular support base. The result has been a humanitarian abomination killing hundreds of thousands of people, producing over six-million refugees, and in sending a politically destabilizing migratory wave of Syrians across Western Europe.
Effectively undermining a survival strategy rooted in war crimes can protect vulnerable populations, weaken the regime, defend allies, and promote political transition.
Although the regime has a special affection for the terror-inducing properties of chemical weapons, these horrific devices account for an extremely small portion of the casualties produced by state terror. By publicly highlighting chemical weapons use as the trigger for military retaliation, the United States and its allies have inadvertently signaled to the Assad regime that other tools of mass terror—barrel bombs, field artillery, rockets, Scud missiles, and conventional aerial bombs—are permissible.
A US-led coalition of more than 50 countries, including Germany, began targeting IS and other terrorist targets with airstrikes in late The anti-IS coalition has dealt major setbacks to the militant group. The Free Syrian Army grew out of protests against the Assad regime that eventually turned violent.
Along with other non-jihadist rebel groups, it seeks the ouster of President Assad and democratic elections. After suffering a number of defeats, many of its members defected to hardline militant groups. It garnered some support from the US and Turkey, but its strength has been greatly diminished.
Fighting between Syrian Kurds and Islamists has become its own conflict. The Kurds have had a tacit understanding with Assad. Seeking to establish its own "caliphate," IS has become infamous for its fundamentalist brand of Islam and its mass atrocities. IS is on the brink of defeat after the US and Russia led separate military campaigns against the militant group. IS is not the only terrorist group that has ravaged Syria. A number of jihadist militant groups are fighting in the conflict, warring against various rebel factions and the Assad regime.
One of the main jihadist factions is Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which controls most of Idlib province and has ties with al-Qaeda. Iran has supported Syria, its only Arab ally, for decades. Eager to maintain its ally, Tehran has provided Damascus with strategic assistance, military training and ground troops when the conflict emerged in The Iran-backed Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah also supports the Assad regime, fighting alongside Iranian forces and paramilitary groups in the country.
It has provided government troops with air support and weapons and given it diplomatic backing at the UN and in international peace talks. Russia also has troops on the ground. While Moscow has said it is targeting IS and other terrorist groups, US officials have repeatedly countered that claim by saying Russian airstrikes are primarily directed against non-IS rebel forces fighting the Assad government. The Kremlin, meanwhile, has accused the US of using its campaign against IS as a way to slow Russian and Syrian government military advances.
It has an important military airbase in the western province of Latakia and a naval base in the Syrian port city of Tartus. Russian leaders support a peace deal with broad consensus among Syria's moderate factions that would allow Assad to remain in power.
Throughout the rest of and until July , the U. In July , the Syrian government threatened the use of biological and chemical weapons if outside forces invaded the country. The following month, President Barack Obama said that if biological or chemical weapons were used, the U. On August 21, , the Syrian government was accused of a chemical weapons attack on a town in the suburbs of Damascus, killing thousands.
On August 31, , Obama announced that he would ask Congress to vote on the use of military force in Syria in response to Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons. It also presents a serious danger to our national security. It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation to terrorist groups who would do our people harm. On September 14, , before Congress could vote on the use of military force in Syria, the U.
The uprising in Syria was sparked by the arrests of 15 children in Daraa who spray painted "the people want to topple the regime" on the wall of a school in March , during the Arab Spring. They were reportedly beaten and tortured in prison. Protesters in Damascus and then Daraa demanded the release of the prisoners. Security forces responded to the protesters by beating them and then opening fire and killing four of them.
The deaths caused the protests to grow throughout the country, and eventually the children were freed from prison. However, tensions between pro-democracy protesters and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's Ba'ath party regime continued.
In July , the Free Syrian Army formed to protect and support protestors. The uprising escalated into a civil war, and according to the United Nations, resulted in 90, deaths by June and climbed to , deaths by August According to the BBC, the conflict then "acquired sectarian overtones, pitching the country's Sunni majority against the president's Shia Alawite sect, and drawn in regional and world powers.
Around , people have died during the war and more than 13 million have fled their homes. Factions and forces have competed for control, triggering tensions—geographic, communal, social, religious, and ethnic—among Syrians. Since , the U. Institute of Peace has helped local leaders engage in outcome-oriented dialogues to promote peace in their communities.
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